

Towards Techno-Orthodox Humanism

Bianka Horváth¹

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**László Gábor Lovászy: On the Renewal of Humanism
– A Presentation of the Book “Enhanced Humans and Humanoid
Robots in a Super-Ageing Society”
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Theoretical Framework & Core Thesis

The global economy and international financial systems are currently on the threshold of a paradigm shift, the significance of which is comparable, on the one hand, to the industrial revolutions or – from a broader historical perspective – the discovery of America – and, on the other hand, to the fact that, based on the experiences of the past decade and a half, we are not witnessing a change comparable to a temporary economic cycle (recession or boom), but are instead experiencing a transformation that transcends such cycles. The volume entitled **The Renewal of Humanism**, subtitled **Enhanced Humans and Humanoid Robots in a Super-Ageing Society**, analyses – drawing on biotechnology, as well as the breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and robotics that began to accelerate around 2012 - the dawn of the post-human era, as also predicted by Francis Fukuyama, with particular regard to its demographic, labour market, economic and financial consequences.

The author, László Lovászy – a human rights expert, lawyer, futurologist and honorary associate professor – drew on several decades of experience in the field of disability issues and public administration whilst serving as a United Nations human rights expert between 2012–2021 and currently serves as a senior adviser on employment policy to the European Parliament – the first person within the European Parliament to do so who has been severely hard of hearing since birth – a fact of particular significance in the context of this volume: the author devotes a separate chapter to the links between disability

1 Dr. habil. Horváth Bianka, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, Tudományos főmunkatárs, UniSpace programigazgató; horvath.bianka@uni-nke.hu

and technological development as part of an overview ranging ‘from war-wounded twenty-somethings to hundred-year-old workers’.

One of the central theses of this work, which draws on more than 800 academic sources and public affairs articles, is that humanity has become capable not only of transforming its physical and economic environment, but also of radically redefining its own biological and cyber-social nature.

In my view, the writing of this academic monography may, in itself, contribute to deepening responsible professional and scientific thinking about our long-term future and to providing an interdisciplinary foundation for strategic decisions. The author’s theoretical approach is unique. The author does not examine technological change in isolation. On the contrary, he adopts a complex perspective that links issues of artificial intelligence, humanoid robotics, biotechnology and the enhancement of human capabilities with a global demographic shift – and, indeed, a demographic megatrend – as a result of which a significant part of the developed world may become a ‘super-aged’ society within a few decades, a prime example of which is Japan. The technological and demographic revolutions thus become two sides of the same historical process and can be viewed as Janus-faced, drawing attention both to the necessity and responsibility of a multi-faceted approach and to the fact that we stand at the threshold between the past and the future. On the one hand, an ever-decreasing number of people of working age would have to sustain the old-age care systems; on the other, however, increasingly advanced artificial intelligence and robotics may become capable of supplementing or replacing human labour. One of the most intriguing questions raised by Lovász’s line of thought is therefore of an economic nature: can technological progress compensate for the economic consequences of demographic decline?

Cover Symbolism & Geopolitical Rivalry

The eye-catching cover conveys an important message. The cover, which is essentially divided into two parts, depicts the convergence of the humanist tradition and the technological future. The red-and-gold side evokes classical, medieval and Renaissance book culture, whilst the blue side evokes the world of AI and algorithms. Clearly recognisable on it are the codex-like botanical ornamentation and initials, the molecular-chemical structures, and, on the other side, the network of electronic circuits and chips. The letters and motifs also reflect this transformation: it is as if an old codex were gradually turning into an algorithm based on numbers of 0/1. The cover thus also serves as an effective means of communication with potential readers: every member of society, and ultimately the reader themselves, is involved in the development of humanism. The cover thus alludes simultaneously to tradition, science and technology, and effectively conveys the book’s central question: how can humanism be preserved and renewed in the age of technology?

The author of this review emphasises that the presentation of the individual chapters has an economic and legal focus; accordingly, the content of the review unfolds with a depth and scope consistent with this.

In the Preface, the author illustrates the pace of technological development with a vivid historical parallel: whilst in 1969 the Apollo space programme sent humans to the Moon with extremely modest computing capacity – almost unimaginably low by today's standards – the everyday digital devices of our time possess many times that capacity. However, this quantitative growth has since given way to a qualitative shift. Computers no longer merely perform calculations; they learn, communicate, generate images and text, and prepare decisions; and, through humanoid robots, they are set to become physical actors in the real world, amongst flesh-and-blood people, within the economy and society – within the foreseeable future.

This explains why humanoid robotics is increasingly becoming an arena of geopolitical competition. According to the picture painted in the book, the technological rivalry between the United States and China is no longer merely about artificial intelligence or semiconductors. A humanoid robot is a complex technological system: it requires an artificial 'brain', sensors, a power source, precision mechanics, software and vast amounts of data. Consequently, the robotics race is simultaneously a competition in semiconductors, batteries, AI, energy and industrial policy.

Economic Paradigm Shift & Production Function

The global economic paradigm shift is taking place at an extremely rapid pace, accelerated by the mass production, emergence and integration of humanoid robots into everyday life, which are acting as a catalyst. The shift is profound, intense and rapid, as the workforce may be easily – though not necessarily – replaceable by a programmable capital asset: the machine itself, the robot. Each of the factors of production – labour, capital and technology – is undergoing transformation; consequently, a new economic approach to the Solow growth model is required, based on the classical production function. It is crucial that productivity increases through technological progress, as long-term, sustainable growth cannot be achieved through the accumulation of capital alone (more technology, i.e. more machinery) or by increasing the population. Artificial intelligence, humanoid robots and space technology are key pillars of the high-tech sectors, as they are innovative technologies with a unique multiplier effect. According to Horváth et al. (2026), the space sector and its exponential growth potential indirectly prevent a premature decline in the return on capital, as technological innovation in this knowledge-intensive sector—which relies on highly skilled professionals—continuously propels economic growth onto a new trajectory. If we incorporate artificial intelligence into the production function, it is worth noting that (from

an objective perspective) it will simultaneously affect all three factors of production:

- ▶ it supports the skilled workforce regardless of demographic trends,
- ▶ invested capital will in fact result in increasing asset values, multiple gains in efficiency and a higher rate of return,
- ▶ technological progress increases total factor productivity exponentially at a systemic level,
- ▶ costs associated with the intellectual workforce are falling and profits are rising, whilst innovation cycles and technological shifts are accelerating.

It is worth highlighting here two related observations by the author, László Lovász: “It is evident that in the US alone, between the 1950s and 2010, the output (productivity) of an industrial worker increased by a factor of roughly ten, such that industrial products were now being produced by nearly 50 per cent fewer people...”. Furthermore, also from the author: “At present, however, we are living in a phase of the Industry 4.0 era in which an economy based on integrated production relying on networks and digital data is taking shape, and the proportion of the contribution made by the living workforce is steadily declining...”, whilst one of the central themes of the author’s book is precisely the supportive supplementation – rather than the replacement – of the intellectual workforce.

These processes may, by their very nature, alter the traditional economic relationship between labour and capital. From an economic perspective, the humanoid robot is a unique hybrid factor of production: it functions as a capital asset whilst also directly performing work processes; moreover, it is (increasingly) capable of making decisions autonomously. Its cost structure therefore differs significantly from that of human labour: rather than wage and social security costs, the focus shifts to energy, maintenance, depreciation and financing costs – and this is good news in terms of creating a secondary economy: it can also generate new jobs. For companies, therefore, the question will increasingly be less about whether they are technologically capable of deploying robots, and more about at what point the total life-cycle cost of a robot becomes lower than the cost of human labour. From this point onwards, the development of humanoid robotics ceases to be primarily a matter of technological curiosity and becomes a question of investment and competitiveness.

Lovász emphasises that a battle is underway for the ‘brains’ of robots – high-performance semiconductors – where the United States remains a dominant player, whilst China has established a significant position in the ‘stomach’ of robots, namely battery technology, which is crucial for energy supply. The rise of CATL is therefore not merely a story of the electric vehicle market: advances in battery technology could also be a defining factor in the future infrastructure of autonomous robotics.

Furthermore, the convergence of robotisation and traditional industry is particularly noteworthy. The collaboration between Europe’s Airbus and China’s UBTech Robotics clearly demonstrates that humanoid robots are no

longer merely futuristic demonstration tools. Industrial testing of the Walker S2 humanoid robots suggests that the technology may also find its way into high value-added manufacturing. Mercedes is already testing humanoid robots in Kecskemét, Hungary. Autonomous battery replacement, meanwhile, is a particularly significant development from an economic perspective: if a robot is capable of maintaining its own power supply without human intervention, it can, in theory, be integrated into a 24-hour production cycle.

Financial Sector & 'Artificial Personhood'

The opening idea of the chapter entitled '*Ecce homo 2.0*' – which also covers the financial sector and discusses algorithms and the concept of the '*artificial person*' – is that transformation in the financial sector began well before the mass emergence of robots operating in physical, '3D' space. According to Morningstar data, as early as 2019, algorithms were executing transactions on a massive scale in capital markets worth several trillion dollars, whilst human actors were increasingly limited to defining decision-making frameworks, risk limits and algorithmic objective functions.

The implications are extremely complex. Changing macro-financial, monetary and capital market conditions act as a comprehensive framework, whilst the transformation of the unipolar world order – based on the US dollar and Western institutions (Bretton Woods) – into a multipolar, fragmented and digitalised system is also triggering structural changes within the financial system. Capital flows, supply chains, geopolitical power dynamics and centres of power are changing, or may change, in a context where active state involvement and the state's responsibility are unquestionable, highlighting the growing role of a state approach focused on stimulation and development (Báger and Parragh, 2020). All this poses a challenge for economies situated on the fault lines and peripheries of these systems, including the Hungarian economy (Botos, 2025). Artificial intelligence-based financial advice, algorithm-driven capital market trading and banking risk management are now becoming increasingly commonplace.

One of the most original legal and economic ideas in Lovász's work is his specific conceptual framework for the category of the introduction of the category of the '*artificial person*' – one of the most significant consequences of the process described – as set out as early as 2018 in his study **Homo Sapiens Conrectus – Behold, the Enhanced Human!** in which the author does not start from the premise that robots should be declared human. On the contrary: a key concern for him is the maintenance of a clear, indeed insurmountable, legal boundary between humans and machines, and, drawing on Roman law, he proposes an intermediate legal category – referring to the institution of slavery – granting limited legal capacity to the 'e-person' as a legal entity (p. 494). The reason for this is that humanoid robots already surpass not only the capabilities of animals (things) but also those of children with limited legal capacity (persons) in the

world of work. Moreover, a system possessing a high degree of autonomy can now carry out economic acts that have legal and financial consequences. It can enter into contracts, move assets, cause damage, provide services and, where appropriate, enter into transactions with other autonomous systems or humans.

To support the author's legal and economic ideas regarding 'artificial persons', I consider it essential to highlight the key messages from the most recent Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium and the G20 Ministerial Meeting on Innovation, both held in late summer 2026. At the G20 Innovation Ministers' Meeting, drawing on Elon Musk's perspective, the faster spread of AI, robotics and digital technology within the financial sector was emphasised in comparison to their spread within the physical economy. According to Elon Musk, digital technology may spread more rapidly in the financial sector than in the physical economy, and whilst artificial intelligence could boost global economic output by 20–30 per cent, robotics could have an even greater impact, with more than one billion humanoid robots expected within the next ten years. It should be noted that the payment ecosystem of the robot economy is based precisely on humanoid robots carrying out tasks independently, during which they will have their own digital wallets and autonomous payment authorisation. According to Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), given the constraints on cross-border payments, more efficient international payments could improve growth prospects; however, the future role of blockchain technology remains uncertain.

Continuing the line of thought in the volume, this leads directly to the issue of liability. Who should bear the economic loss caused by an autonomous system: the manufacturer, the programmer, the owner, the user, or the separate pool of assets behind the autonomous system itself? Lovász also applies a modernised analogy of the Roman legal concept of *'peculium'* to this problem.

The financial significance of this concept can hardly be overestimated. If autonomous artificial systems carry out economic transactions of ever-increasing value, then sooner or later the question may arise of their own insurance, segregated cover, a compulsory liability scheme, and indeed, in a certain sense, their own 'balance sheet', since the standardised electronic format of financial statements for companies listed on European stock exchanges already creates an environment in which algorithms can process them and even automatically prepare investment decisions. The concept of an artificial person is thus not merely a matter of legal-philosophical speculation, but one of the potential issues for future financial regulation; so, in my view, the question of liability rightly arises practically from the very outset.

Global Trends, Productivity & 'Purple Collar' Labour

In particular, the market forecasts cited in the sub-chapter entitled *'Before the Storm? – Global Trends up to 2030'*, which discusses the issue of humanoid robots

as a new asset class and legal entity, illustrate the potential scale of this change. Goldman Sachs anticipates rapid growth in the humanoid robot market, whilst Bank of America's longer-term forecast suggests that by 2060 there could be as many as several billion humanoid robots in operation worldwide. If even a fraction of this comes to pass – to return to Elon Musk's previously cited view – the humanoid robot could become a mass-market product on a par with motor vehicles, personal computers or smartphones.

Unit cost is a decisive factor in this process. Humanoid robots will only become truly significant in macroeconomic terms when their price and running costs allow for their widespread use in businesses and, subsequently, in households. As Lovász points out, the long-term price point of around twenty thousand dollars cited for the Tesla Optimus, along with industry forecasts suggesting a further reduction in the hardware costs of humanoid robots, are significant because, below a certain price threshold, companies' investment calculations could fundamentally change. The spread of humanoid robotics could be accelerated by classic economies of scale and learning effects: a surge in production could reduce unit costs, making the technology economically viable for a wider range of users and thereby encouraging further investment. In this sense, the humanoid robot could become one of the defining new capital assets of the 21st century, in relation to which the author of this review's previously highlighted supporting observations regarding the Solow growth model and the production function are also relevant.

It is significant that an important public policy dilemma arises from the book's line of argument. As Lovász demonstrates, the owner of a humanoid robot benefits from the surplus productivity generated by automation, whilst the worker who loses their job or whose bargaining position is weakened does not necessarily do so. Robotisation can therefore simultaneously increase overall social welfare and income and wealth inequality. The question is not merely how much GDP robots generate, but also who controls the income created by robots. Let us not forget that, in the meantime, the demographic constraint shaping this megatrend is becoming a reality, meaning that increasing labour efficiency and productivity is playing an ever-greater role – an important component of growth driven by high-quality resources.

As can be seen from the sub-chapter entitled *'The Perspective of Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Legal Entities'*, one of the strongest economic strands of Lovász's analysis is the linking of population ageing and robotisation with migration trends and issues. Indeed, the economic challenge of the second half of the 21st century in many developed societies may not be excessively rapid population growth, but rather a decline in the working-age population and a rise in the proportion of older people, which fundamentally alters the debate on technological unemployment.

In his monograph, the author contrasts Julian Simon's *'ultimate resource'* theory with this newer approach, which holds that technological progress no longer necessarily requires continuous population growth. Drawing on the

ideas of Joel Mokyr, it can be argued that, in the age of artificial intelligence, innovative capacity depends less and less on the sheer number of people, and increasingly on the quality of knowledge, technological infrastructure and the efficiency of human-machine collaboration. The perspective presented in the sub-chapter entitled *‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution – not (just) industrial and not (just) a revolution?’* is nothing short of astonishing: according to the automation scenarios examined by McKinsey and cited by the author, artificial intelligence, automation and digital technologies could substantially accelerate productivity growth – at up to four times the rate seen during the First Industrial Revolution. This is crucial because, in an ageing society, it is no longer necessarily an increase in the size of the workforce, but rather a rise in output per worker that becomes one of the main sources of sustainable growth.

This gives rise to one of the book’s provocative economic questions: can the concepts of demographic decline and labour shortage be partially separated? Technology is, of course, unable to replace humans in a demographic sense, but alongside rising productivity, it can alleviate the pressure on output and public finances arising from the decline in the working-age population. Alongside traditional dependency ratios, it may therefore become increasingly important to examine the technological capital and value added per active worker.

In this chapter, it is important to recognise the productivity gap between the US and the EU and its main causes, which support the author’s line of argument. The Central Bank’s Productivity Report (MNB, 2024) illustrates that, over the past quarter of a century or so, the US has achieved an average annual economic growth rate of 2.2 per cent, whilst the European Union has achieved 1.5 per cent; furthermore, labour productivity in the US was around 33 per cent higher than the EU average in 2023. It is significant that the US’s advantage stems primarily from faster growth in factor productivity and, to a lesser extent, from capital deepening. The reason for this is that companies in the European Union have been unable to adapt the most advanced technologies with sufficient efficiency over recent decades. The adoption of rapidly spreading artificial intelligence, including generative AI, is much faster than that of the internet or personal computers (Bick et al., 2024). The exponential growth of this technology is also telling, as the number of AI patents globally increased more than twelve-fold between 2017 and 2022 (rising from 5,000 to over 60,000). However, China continues to lead the way, accounting for 61 per cent of all AI patents worldwide, with the US accounting for 21 per cent and the EU for just 2 per cent. The key to the EU’s competitiveness lies in boosting productivity more vigorously than ever before, given its declining population. According to Draghi, if the EU is unable to exceed the average productivity growth rate seen since 2015 in the future, GDP will stagnate by 2050 (Draghi, 2024).

According to Lovász, productivity growth is particularly important from the perspective of pension systems as well. Pay-as-you-go systems are traditionally assessed through the ratio of active workers to pensioners – however, in a

highly automated economy, it may become apparent that this indicator alone is no longer sufficient.

This, in turn, leads to a question that fiscal policy in the coming decades will find it hard to avoid: if the share of labour declines whilst the share of robotised capital increases, on what tax base should the welfare state be built? In addition, the new EU VAT rules and the operation of the IOSS system directly affect the small electronic components, sensors, microchips, and cables that are essential for the development and repair of humanoid robots, which further complicates the issue (Bakai et al., 2022).

This chapter also centres on the relationship between humans and machines. Lovász, however, does not anticipate the loss of jobs alone. One of the book's interesting new concepts is the 'purple-collar' worker, which signifies a move beyond the traditional blue-, white- and pink-collar categories.

According to the new definition introduced by Lovász, the purple-collar worker does not attempt to compete with machines in areas where they are inherently more efficient, but rather works alongside them. In this model, humanoid robots, cobots and generative artificial intelligence act as multipliers of human capabilities. Humans' comparative advantage is likely to lie increasingly in those skills that are difficult to formalise: value judgements, creative problem-solving, empathetic and culturally sensitive decision-making, and the building of trusting relationships.

In my view, this is particularly relevant in the context of a super-ageing society. This complementarity may prove particularly important in those human services for which there is growing demand in ageing societies, whilst their provision continues to require a significant personal presence, empathy or professional judgement – yet these are areas that can be understood within our existing conceptual frameworks, as the 'purple-collar' category, from this perspective, goes beyond merely being a new labour market label. It expresses the assumption that, in the next phase of automation, competitive advantage will be created by the optimal collaboration between humans and artificial intelligence. It is important for humans to combine their unique abilities with a high level of competence in the use of machine intelligence. It is in this sense that Lovász has been using the term 'post-Renaissance polymath' for almost a decade now. In this context, cobots and humanoid robots may not necessarily appear as replacements for humans, but rather as complements to their physical and cognitive capacities, as 'outsourced' units.

In his 2022 research exploring the significance of human-robot collaboration, the author's findings—made in the context of the incentivising Hungarian state model, the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, and crisis management—were discussed in relation to the 'triple revolution' (Lovász, 2022). According to Lovász, technological progress does not necessarily entail a rollback of social rights; the significance of this is underlined by the fact that in 2026, the Hangzhou Intermediate People's Court in China, in a labour case relating to artificial intelligence-based automation, ruled that the introduction

of AI by an employer cannot, in itself, be regarded as a significant change in the objective circumstances forming the basis of the employment contract which would automatically justify the dismissal of the employee. The employer cannot, therefore, simply pass on the business risk arising from technological innovation to the employee. It follows from all this that greater technological advancement itself may necessitate new standards of protection under employment law.

Biotech Social Revolution & Techno-Orthodox Humanism

In the chapter entitled *‘On certain theoretical, legal and philosophical issues of the biotech-social revolution: the crisis of humanism’* – which also addresses the topics of the robot as a consumer and the economics of ‘co-evolution’ – the author puts forward one of the volume’s most provocative propositions, which relates to a rethinking of the consumer perspective. In traditional macroeconomic logic, a declining population may, in the longer term, reduce not only the labour supply but also consumer demand. Fewer people may require fewer homes, less food, fewer transport services and fewer durable consumer goods. However, a robotised economy may create a new, distinct segment of demand.

The robot itself is, of course, not a consumer in the traditional sense of human needs. The widespread adoption of robots could create independent secondary markets in the areas of energy supply, hardware maintenance, software and data infrastructure, as well as insurance and financing services. The production of these generates actual economic activity and demand. To illustrate this, Lovász draws a parallel with the needs of children: a child is neither a member of the workforce nor an independent productive force, nor a consumer, yet their consumption is still part of economic demand. Similarly, the maintenance of robots can also contribute to economic turnover.

If humanoid robots do indeed appear on a scale of hundreds of millions, and eventually billions, worldwide, a separate ‘robot economy’ could emerge: one with markets for energy, components, repair services, software, data, insurance and financing produced specifically for robots. This would no longer simply represent the market for robot-manufacturing companies, but – as we have seen previously – an entirely separate secondary ecosystem: the sub-economy of artificial persons.

This idea is noteworthy because it effectively reverses the traditional relationship between population decline and economic growth. If, alongside a decline in the biological population, the stock of autonomous machines increases, the number of active units operating in the economy will not necessarily decrease at the same rate. This is why the interpretation of GDP and GDP per capita may raise new questions: what does ‘per capita’ economic output mean in an economy where an ever-increasing proportion of production is no longer carried out by human agents?

Beyond all this, the volume also raises numerous other questions that are at once fiscal, economic, bioethical and philosophical, such as how biotechnological developments might transform the concept of human capital ('homo sapiens conrectus' – the 'enhanced human?'), how they might exacerbate wealth and social disparities, and how certain inequalities might become, in part, biologically entrenched. At the same time, the growing autonomy of humanoid systems brings the issues of 'co-evolution' and new social hierarchies to the fore.

The chapter entitled '*Summary: On the emergence of Homo sapiens conrectus and the challenges of a super-ageing society – what might the future hold?*' also highlights the volume's significance in filling a gap in the literature; it is a high-quality, value-adding work of scholarship. It is no exaggeration to say that humanism is also an economic issue. László Lovászy's monograph, **On the Renewal of Humanism**, cannot be categorised under any single academic discipline; it adopts an interdisciplinary approach, which the author maintains as a guiding principle throughout the entire work via a clear, logical train of thought. It is at once a work of legal, social-philosophical, technological, biotechnological, demographic and economic nature. It is precisely this interdisciplinarity that gives the book its unique character and greatest strength, whilst, in my view, it may also give rise to one of its potential points of contention. The volume covers an extremely broad scope; consequently, certain economic interrelationships – such as the fiscal effects of robotisation, the distribution of income between capital and labour, or the long-term productivity implications of automation – would, in themselves, require further modelling-based analysis. However, this is less a shortcoming than a consequence of the research programme opened up by the book: a source of academic and professional inspiration.

From a public finance perspective, the book's approach – which does not treat the demographic crisis solely as a matter of population policy – is particularly valuable. An ageing population, the rise of artificial intelligence, the emergence of humanoid robots, the biotechnological transformability of human capital, and the financial sustainability of welfare systems are all interrelated elements of the same structural change.

The book's relevance is further underscored by one of its most important economic insights: in the second half of the 21st century, it is conceivable that the traditional link between population and economic performance will weaken. A society's biological population may decline, whilst its productive capacity may continue to grow through robotisation, artificial intelligence and the technological extension of human capabilities. If this comes to pass, we will need to rethink our concepts of productivity, employment, the dependency ratio, consumption and, to some extent, even the measurement of economic growth.

At the same time, it is precisely here that we can understand and appreciate Lovászy's most important warning: the efficiency optimum does not in itself constitute a social optimum; what increases output or reduces costs does not necessarily simultaneously strengthen human autonomy, equal opportunities

or social cohesion. It is possible to have an economy in which robots increase GDP, algorithms allocate capital more efficiently, and biotechnology enhances human capabilities, whilst, as a consequence of all this, social inequalities grow, human autonomy is weakened, and humanity's privileged place within its own economic system becomes precarious.

In this sense, the title of the book – *On the Renewal of Humanism* – is not merely a philosophical programme, but can also be interpreted as an economic proposition.

The ultimate question posed by Lovász's book is therefore not whether we will have intelligent humanoid robots, whether human biology can be enhanced, or whether algorithms will make an increasing number of economic decisions. Given the current direction of technological development, these processes are already underway to varying degrees. The real question is how all this can be integrated into an economic, legal and moral framework. The author's answer is that a renewal of humanism will be necessary, which is none other than 'techno-orthodox humanism'.

In Lovász's interdisciplinary approach, techno-orthodox humanism is a technologically progressive form of humanism that supports the technological fulfilment of human beings (artificial insemination, hearing and vision implants, etc.), but rejects the transcendence or relativisation of humanity's distinctive moral and legal status. The term 'techno-orthodox humanism' carries a deliberate tension, partly because the prefix 'techno-' refers to the modern technological era, particularly AI, robotics and biotechnology, as the new technological context for humanist thought, whilst 'orthodox' signifies an adherence to the privileged moral and legal status of human beings. This adherence is technologically open, yet it affirms the supreme value of humanity. The central message of Lovász's book is therefore built around this technologically open, yet anthropologically 'orthodox' idea. 'Humanism', in turn, ultimately provides the concept's normative centre: human beings are not simply an intelligent biological system amongst others, but beings endowed with a unique value, dignity and moral-legal status, and it is in this that the book's central idea finds its fulfilment.

This volume represents added value in the process of renewing economic thinking.

I wholeheartedly recommend this groundbreaking volume—which comprehensively presents the latest technological trends prevailing in the global economy and affecting the Hungarian economy, along with their economic and social impacts—to economic and social decision-makers, business leaders and professionals, as well as to researchers, university lecturers and students. Finally, based on the author's professional and research experience, which draws on a wide range of international literature, this work can be regarded as an innovative, community-building and community-shaping contribution that offers hope for the renewal of humanism.

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